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Who Studies International Law? Explaining
Cross-national Variation in Compulsory
International Legal Education
Ryan Scoville
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, WI

Mark Berlin
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
The compulsory study of international law is a universal component of legal education in some states but
extremely uncommon or non-existent in others. This article uses global data and statistical methods to test a
number of conceivable explanations for this puzzling feature of international society. In contrast to much of the
empirical literature on state behaviour in relation to international law, we find that functionalist and sociopolitical variables carry little explanatory power and that historical variables – specifically, legal tradition and
regional geography – instead account for the overwhelming majority of the global pattern. We explore potential
explanations for these findings and discuss implications for scholars, legal educators and policy-makers.

Since the mid-20th century, international law has exhibited an overtly self-promotional quality; in addition to
articulating primary and secondary rules of conduct, the law has called upon states to cultivate public
knowledge about those rules. Numerous resolutions from the United Nations (UN) General Assembly have
prodded states to foster the study of international law in higher education.1 A resolution from 1992, for
example, invited national governments to ‘encourage their educational institutions to introduce courses in
international law for students studying law, political science, social sciences and other relevant
disciplines’.2 Similarly, a handful of major multilateral treaties require parties to propagate treaty norms.3 Parties
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for instance, ‘undertake … to disseminate the text of [the conventions] as
widely as possible in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof
may become known to the entire population’.4 These efforts reflect a standard assumption that education can
be a powerful mechanism of norm socialization and maintenance.
Yet the commonality of international legal education varies immensely across states. Data on the curricula of
over 2,000 law schools from around the world show acute disparities in the extent to which law students must
complete a course on public international law en route to obtaining a law degree.5 Compulsory international
legal education (CILE) is extremely uncommon or non-existent in places such as South Korea and the USA but
more or less universal in places such as China, Iran and Russia.6
This variation is puzzling. International law, after all, applies to every state and is, in that sense, equally relevant
to every law student. Support for the various UN General Assembly resolutions and multilateral treaties that
promote the study of international law has been widespread.7 And an influential line of research in sociology has
documented a multifaceted shift towards global standardization in the structural features and substantive
content of mass education.8 There is evidence that human rights education, for example, has spread to primary
and secondary schools throughout the world9 and that universities tend to follow common curricular models
and trends.10 There is also evidence of increasing isomorphism in legal education. Courses in alternative dispute
resolution and programmes of public interest law, among other offerings, have reportedly proliferated among
national jurisdictions in recent decades.11 This research suggests the existence of a world society that socializes
actors to implement common programmes of instruction, irrespective of local conditions and needs. In such a
context, it is intriguing that universities would adopt wildly different approaches to the one area of law that has
traditionally claimed universality.
Cross-national variation in CILE is also likely to be important. It could very well indicate an asymmetrical
diffusion of knowledge. It may reflect differences in elite attitudes on the value of international law. And it
conceivably generates disparate levels of norm internalization and support among national publics.12 Indeed,
recent experimental research has found that individuals are more likely to favour action that conforms to
international obligations if they are aware that it conforms.13 This suggests that legal professionals in states with
high rates of CILE may embrace international law-compliant behaviour to a greater extent than their
counterparts in states with low rates of CILE. Insofar as those same professionals occupy influential positions in
government, industry and civil society, their CILE-based views could very well shape state behaviour and the
efficacy of international norms.14
But what accounts for the variation? We seek to provide answers. Using a new dataset on CILE, we test a range
of hypotheses drawn from empirical research on state behaviour towards international law. In brief, we find
that legal tradition is not only the most important determinant of CILE rates but almost independently
dispositive; whereas civil law and Islamic law jurisdictions tend to have extremely high rates of CILE, the rates in
common law jurisdictions tend to be quite low. To the extent that CILE rates vary among common law states,
the variation is almost entirely explained by geographic region.

The study makes a number of contributions. Most generally, it advances the study of comparative international
law. Considerable research has identified cross-national differences of approach to international law,15 and
scholars have proffered a variety of explanations for these differences. Some point to functionalist explanations
by emphasizing the role of state interests.16 On these accounts, states adopt divergent approaches to
international law because they encounter strategic incentives to do so. Others highlight socio-political
explanations by focusing on variables such as democracy, which is said to condition affinities for international
law independent of strategic interests.17 Still others emphasize historical explanations by suggesting that actors
instinctively approach international law in disparate ways after acquiring unique values, understandings and
techniques from their respective national legal traditions.18 All of these explanations appear sensible, but they
are essentially untested hypotheses that leave substantial uncertainty about the relative causal significance of
variables such as national interest and legal tradition. In testing for the determinants of CILE, we offer fresh
empirical insights on the etiology of comparative international law.
We do so, moreover, on the basis of atypical evidence. The most common approach in the literature has been to
explore a single state’s or region’s treatment of a discrete legal question.19 This work has been valuable but
heavily reliant on qualitative methods and focused on the practices of a small number of states, of which a
majority are major powers. The CILE data, in contrast, are not only sufficiently voluminous to permit quantitative
analysis but also globally inclusive, covering states from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. The data thus stand as a
particularly promising source of discovery.
The study also offers a range of specific lessons for scholars and policy-makers. In demonstrating the influence
of legal tradition and regional geography, the findings highlight the resilience of legal families in an era of
extensive globalization. In establishing that CILE is much more pervasive in civil law and Islamic law states, the
findings raise new questions about the efficacy of international norms in relation to common law jurisdictions,
including those that tend to identify themselves as essential advocates for the international rule of law. And in
demonstrating that CILE rates do not reflect variations in other conditions, such as national functional need for
international legal knowledge, the findings suggest opportunities for educational reform.
The study proceeds as follows. We describe our dataset and methodology, test a succession of facially plausible
explanations for cross-national variation with respect to CILE and then reveal the results. After doing so, we
explore potential mechanisms driving the results, including path dependency, diffusion and tradition-specific
philosophies of legal education, and then conclude by discussing implications.

1 The CILE Dataset
The starting point for the study is the CILE dataset, which comprises information on the curricula of over 2,000
law schools from a majority of states.20 In 2014, one of us collected these data from foreign governments, the
websites of university law faculties and, in some cases, email correspondence with faculty members. Where the
available sources indicated that the core curriculum for a law degree includes a compulsory course on ‘public
international law’, ‘international law’, ‘international human rights law’ or any other topic that plainly implicates
public international law, the associated law school was coded as having CILE. Inversely, where courses on public
international law were elective, unavailable or mandatory only within elective course streams, the associated
school was coded as not having CILE. From these data, we generated national CILE rates, which indicate the
percentage of law schools in each state that require students to complete at least one course in public
international law. In all, the dataset contains rates for 161 states.21
Figure 1 geographically depicts these rates, which range from a minimum of 0 per cent to a maximum of 100 per
cent and an average of 79.6 per cent. The data show significant fluctuations in the commonality of CILE; in many
parts of the world, all law students must study public international law to obtain their degree, but, in others,

such compulsory training is rare or non-existent. Figure 2 shows the distribution of CILE rates across all states in
the dataset. Two features are immediately striking about this distribution. First, it is almost entirely bimodal; the
great majority of states have either a very high rate or a very low rate, with 82.6 per cent of states falling within
10 per cent of either 0 per cent or 100 per cent. This indicates a high degree of intra-state uniformity with
respect to CILE. Second, most states have high rates of CILE. In total, 68.9 per cent have rates of 90 per cent or
higher, and 83.2 per cent have rates of 50 per cent or higher, indicating that, in general, compulsory
international legal education is the norm around the world.
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of CILE Rates

Figure 2: Numerical Distribution of CILE Rates

To be clear, the data do not indicate the total volume of international legal education that occurs. They do not
account for bar examinations, judicial training or any other non-university source of compulsory instruction;
courses that are mandatory only for advanced law degrees, such as master of law and doctorate of law degrees;
or electives or training that professors might incorporate into courses with titles that are unrelated to public
international law. Nevertheless, the data reflect all or nearly all law school curricula in a majority of states. And
while the countries for which there is no information tend to exhibit lower levels of economic development, we
think it unlikely that they systematically differ from the geographically, culturally and politically diverse
collection of other lesser-developed countries for which data were successfully collected. In short, we believe
that the schools on which we were able to collect data should be representative of those on which we were
unable to do so.

2 Hypotheses and Tests
What explains the global patterns? Unaware of any existing research on this question,22 we have no prior
expectations regarding the factors that will or will not correlate with CILE. High rates often appear to correspond
with national laws that compel or recommend the study of international law for all law students,23 but it is
unclear why some states would adopt such measures, while others would not. Thus, we derive a list of plausible
hypotheses from research on state behaviour in relation to international law. We divide these hypotheses into
three categories – functional, socio-political and historical – and test each in turn below.
To carry out these tests, we classify states into two categories: (i) ‘high CILE’ states in which at least half of the
universities require their law students to complete a course on international law and (ii) ‘low-CILE’ states in
which less than half of the universities mandate such a course. We adopt this approach rather than analyse
variations in absolute values because we think it is more analytically useful. In other words, though two states
may have rates of, say, 75 per cent and 85 per cent, we think it is more revealing to treat them both as high-CILE
states and analyse what accounts for their difference from low-CILE states than it would be to try to account for
the small gap between their high rates. Figure 3 depicts the categorization of each state.24
Figure 3: High- and Low-CILE Classifications

After establishing these classifications, we analyse their relationship with each explanatory variable of interest.
We begin by quantitatively assessing the strength of the bivariate relationship between each potential CILE
predictor and the outcomes of high and low CILE. For each variable that is continuous (that is, non-binary), we
separately calculate its average value for states falling into the high- and low-CILE categories and use t-tests to
assess whether the two averages are statistically distinguishable. For explanatory variables that are binary, we
separately calculate the percentage of cases for which the variable is present or absent across the high- and lowCILE categories and use a chi-squared statistic to test the significance of the results. To check the robustness of
the bivariate results, we run a set of multivariate logistic regressions that include all of the possible explanatory
variables.

A Functionalist Explanations
A functionalist approach to international law understands the creation of international legal rules as the product
of demand for mechanisms to improve efficiency and solve cooperation problems, such as by reducing
transaction costs and increasing transparency.25 As applied to law school curricula, such an approach would
posit that schools respond to needs for training in areas of law that are particularly active. To illustrate, one
might expect law schools in European Union (EU) member states to be more likely than those in non-member
states to require training in EU law. From this perspective, training in international law should be in especially
high demand in states where societal actors – governments, firms, courts and so on – are more likely to confront
issues that touch on international law.

We identify four variables that should increase societal demand for training. The first is trade openness. The
more a state participates in the global trading system, the more likely it is to be involved in disputes about
international trade rules and the more domestic demand there should be for expertise in the intricacies of
international trade law. Measuring trade openness as the total annual value of imports and exports as a
percentage of a state’s gross domestic product (GDP),26 we expect that law schools in states where trade
accounts for a greater proportion of the economy will be more likely to require training in international law.
The second variable is globalization, which refers to the ‘increase in the flow of people, capital, goods, services,
and ideas across national borders’.27 Scholars have long argued that globalization creates a need for
international legal training by generating political and economic links that rely upon supra-national norms.28 By
this logic, it is plausible that the popular need for international legal training is greatest in countries that are
more globalized. We measure globalization using the Swiss Economic Institute’s (KOF) Index of Globalization – a
composite of 23 different indicators of economic, social and political globalization that ranges from 0 (least
globalized) to 100 (most globalized)29 – and expect that law schools in states with higher globalization scores will
be more likely to exhibit high CILE.
The third variable is economic development. Richer countries are home to larger numbers of multinational
corporations, more likely to be a source of foreign direct investment and more likely to participate in
international organizations, all of which generates need for expertise in international law.30 We measure
economic development as real GDP per capita31 and, following conventional practice, take the natural log of this
measure to compensate for the fact that differences among states at the low end of the distribution are more
impactful than differences at the high end.32 We expect that law schools in states with higher GDP per capita will
be more likely to exhibit high CILE.
The final variable is monism/dualism. A traditional characterization holds that monist legal systems embrace the
integration of international law and municipal law, while dualist systems hold the two apart. Given these
structural relations, international law should play a greater role in the legal systems of monist states, which
should in turn experience greater demand for international legal expertise. We follow previous research in
measuring monist states as those in which the municipal constitution designates treaties as either superior or
equal to domestic law33 and rely on data from the Comparative Constitutions Project.34 Our expectation is that
monist states respond to the projected demand for international legal expertise by adopting CILE at higher rates.
Table 1 displays average values across the high- and low-CILE groups for each of the continuous functionalist
variables. On these measures, high- and low-CILE states are virtually indistinguishable from one another. In the
cases of trade openness and economic development, the differences indicate a negative relationship to CILE,
which is the opposite of our prediction. In the case of globalization, the difference indicates a positive
relationship to CILE, which is consistent with our prediction. In all cases, however, the differences are small and
fail to reach statistical significance, suggesting that these variables cannot account for cross-national disparities
in CILE classifications.
Table 1: Functionalist Explanations for Variation in CILE (Continuous Variables)
Variables
Average for lowAverage for highCILE states
CILE states
Trade openness (trade as % of GDP)
100.52%
91.66%
Globalization (KOF globalization
59.94
60.40
index)
Economic development (GDP per
8.97
8.75
capita in dollars, logged)

Statistically significant
difference?
No
No
No

Table 2 displays the cross-tabulation for monism/dualism. In total, 91.23 per cent of monist states and 82.65 per
cent of dualist states qualify for the high-CILE designation. Thus, monism does exhibit a positive relationship
with CILE, but this difference does not meet standard levels of statistical significance, meaning that, from a
statistical standpoint, the relationship between monism and CILE is indistinguishable from chance.
Table 2: Functionalist Explanations for Variation in CILE (Binary Variables)
Monism/Dualism
Percentage of states with
Statistically significant difference?
Low CILE (%)
High CILE (%)
Monist (57)
8.77 (5)
91.23 (52)
No
Dualist (98)
17.35 (17)
82.65 (81)
Overall (155)
14.19 (22)
85.81 (133)
Note: Parentheses indicate number of states.
In sum, none of the functionalist variables explain cross-national differences in CILE. This finding is surprising
given the ubiquity of functionalist accounts of state behaviour towards international law,35 and it suggests one
sense in which law schools are not highly responsive to societal needs.

B Socio-Political Explanations
The next set of explanations focuses on socio-political conditions. In contrast to functionalist explanations,
which take a state’s preferences as given in light of its functional needs, these variables speak to factors that
shape a state’s social or political affinity for international law regardless of functional need for international law
expertise. The first is regime type. An influential literature at the intersection of law and international relations
theory posits that liberal and illiberal states approach international law in divergent ways.36 Liberal states are
said to be more likely to comply with international rules because they are committed to the rule of law, tend to
accord supreme status to international law in their domestic constitutions and exhibit higher levels of
transparency, which facilitates monitoring.37 By this logic, liberal states should value international legal
knowledge more than illiberal states and, in turn, make greater efforts to promote associated studies. We
measure regime type using a 21-point index from the Polity IV dataset, which comprises indicators of the
openness and competitiveness of political institutions and constraints on government power, ranging from –10
(most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Law schools in states that are more democratic should be more
likely to have high rates of CILE.
The second socio-political variable is human rights protection. Research has found a link between a state’s
respect for human rights and its willingness to subject itself to strong international legal enforcement
mechanisms. For example, states with better human rights records are more likely to join the International
Criminal Court38 and commit to the optional protocols of human rights treaties, which establish more intrusive
individual complaint mechanisms.39 This evidence raises the possibility that state respect for human rights
fosters a more general tendency to embrace international law, including in the curricula of legal education. We
measure human rights protection using the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores, which use 13 datasets on
various aspects of political repression to derive overall levels of rights protection.40 Our expectation is that states
with higher scores will be more likely to have high rates of CILE.
The third socio-political variable concerns links to global civil society. Research in sociology, political science and
cultural anthropology shows that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are a key conduit
through which international norms diffuse to domestic institutions and political culture.41 From this perspective,
societies with greater concentrations of INGO activity should be more culturally disposed towards international
law and, thus, more likely to include it as a mandatory component of legal education. We measure global civil
society using data from the Yearbook of International Associations, which provides an annual count of the total
number of INGOs that claim at least one member in each state.42 Following common practice,43 we divide those

annual counts by population size to produce comparable measures of relative INGO prevalence and expect that
states with greater numbers of INGOs per capita will have higher rates of CILE.
Table 3 displays the average values of the socio-political variables across states in the high- and low-CILE groups.
All three variables exhibit slight differences in the opposite direction of our prediction. High-CILE states appear
to be less democratic, more prone to human rights violations and less embedded in global civil society.
Nevertheless, only the differences in human rights protection are statistically significant. One possible
interpretation of this finding is that states adopt CILE to help defuse internal or external criticism about lack of
respect for international law, including human rights law. Another is that states with poor track records on
human rights adopt CILE in order to improve. We currently lack the longitudinal data necessary to test these
possibilities, but both raise intriguing questions for future research. In sum, most of the socio-political variables
fail to explain variation in CILE, suggesting that law school curricula are substantially disconnected from the
political preferences of national governments.
Table 3: Socio-Political Explanations for Variation in CILE (Continuous Variables)
Variable
Average for low-CILE Average for high-CILE
states
states
Regime type (Polity 2 index)
6.94
4.89
Human rights protection
2.05
0.72
(Fariss scores)
Global civil society
0.58
0.34
(INGOs per capita)
Note: * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.

Statistically significant
difference?
No
Yes***
No

C Historical Explanations
The final set of explanations focuses on national characteristics that are exogenously given and largely
unchangeable. These characteristics are the product of historical circumstance and independent of both
functional needs and socio-political attitudes. The first is state age, which could predict CILE in either of two
opposite ways. On the one hand, it might correlate positively, such that older states, which tend to be Western
and relatively powerful, fall into the high-CILE category more often than newer states, which tend to be part of
the global South.44 This relationship might result from conceivably age-based disparities in national affinity for
international norms; for most of modern history since Vitoria, the West has used international law to facilitate
colonization and imperialism.45 Having benefited from this history, older states might view international law
favourably and respond by adopting CILE at high rates. Newer states, in contrast, might be less inclined to
pursue CILE if they object to the long-standing domination of international institutions and law-making by older
and more powerful states.46
On the other hand, newer states may be more prone to high CILE than older states. In the decades after World
War II, international law began to foster arguments for decolonization and support claims of independence
more generally, with the UN, itself a product of international law, positioned as a central global authority for
recognizing such claims.47 States have thus inverted international law, at least in part, from a device that
legitimates the domination of the strong against the weak to one that the weak can use to limit abuse by the
strong. From this perspective, newer states might embrace international law more than older states, including
by adopting CILE at higher rates. To account for such divergent possibilities, we treat state age as a bidirectional
hypothesis. We measure our independent variable using dates of independence from the Issue Correlates of
War Colonial History Dataset48 and take the natural log of this measure to reduce the skewness of its
distribution.

The second historical factor is legal tradition, which refers to ‘deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes
about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization of the
legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught’.49 Research
has suggested that legal traditions such as the common law and the civil law shape national laws and policies
across a wide range of matters, notwithstanding the homogenizing influence of globalization.50 Economists, for
instance, have found that ‘civil law is associated with a heavier hand of government ownership and regulation’
and that ‘common law is associated with lower formalism in judicial procedures and greater judicial
independence’.51 Similar dynamics reportedly extend to international law. For example, Sara Mitchell and Emilia
Powell find that civil law states are more likely than common law and Islamic law states to commit to the
International Court of Justice’s compulsory jurisdiction, and Pierre-Hughes Verdier and Mila Versteeg find that
civil law states are far more likely than common law states to allow for the direct application of international
law.52
There is no single, agreed-upon typology for classifying legal traditions, and scholars have disagreed about the
appropriateness of different distinctions.53 Given this disagreement, we adopt the broadest concept of legal
tradition, classifying all states into common law, civil law, Islamic law and mixed legal traditions. This typology
has been employed frequently by political scientists, who have found the categories to have robust explanatory
power in accounting for patterns in government behaviour towards the law.54 To classify states, we use the
groupings defined by Emilia Powell and Sara Mitchell55 and anticipate that civil law states will be the most likely
to have high rates of CILE, given that they appear to be the most favourably disposed towards the international
legal system overall.
The final historical factor is region. There is substantial evidence that norms diffuse more readily among actors
located in spatial proximity to one another.56 For instance, pension privatization spread within Latin America
before it appeared in other parts of the world,57 and states have been more inclined to participate in, and
comply with, Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund when their regional counterparts do likewise.58 It is
thus plausible that states within a given region will converge on similar curricula. We code states using UN
continental regional classifications59 – Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania – and add two additional,
narrower classifications to better represent groupings of legal peers: Middle East and North Africa and postSoviet Union. Our expectation is that there will be a convergence of CILE rates within each of these regions.
Table 4 displays the average levels of state age (logged) across high- and low-CILE states. The levels for these
two groups are almost indistinguishable. Although high-CILE states are slightly older on average than low-CILE
states, the difference is not statistically significant, suggesting that state age is unrelated to CILE.
Table 4: Historical Explanations for Variation in CILE (Continuous Variables)
Variable
Average for low-CILE
Average for high-CILE
states
states
State age (logged) 4.30
4.38

Statistically significant
difference?
No

Table 5 displays high- and low-CILE outcomes for legal tradition and region. Compared to functionalist and sociopolitical variables, these factors offer robust explanatory power. In fact, a combination of legal tradition and
region can explain most variation across the entire sample. On the one hand, civil law and Islamic law tradition
are extremely strong predictors of high national rates of compulsory training: 95 per cent of civil law states and
100 per cent of Islamic law states fall into the high-CILE classification, compared to 83.23 per cent of the overall
sample, and the differences are statistically significant. On the other hand, only 57.78 per cent of common law
states fall into the high-CILE classification. This figure is markedly lower than that of the overall sample, and the
difference between them is statistically significant at the < 0.01 level, showing that common law states overall

are less likely to exhibit high rates of compulsory training. The commonality of the high-CILE classification among
states with mixed systems is statistically indistinguishable from that of the overall sample, suggesting that mixed
systems are neither more nor less likely to adopt compulsory programmes of instruction.
Canada nicely illustrates these dynamics. Most of the Canadian provinces use only the common law, but Quebec
maintains elements of a civil law system inherited from the French. Notwithstanding the global tendency for
high levels of intra-state uniformity with respect to CILE,60 Canadian law schools take markedly different
approaches depending on the legal tradition under which they operate: virtually none of the schools in the
common law provinces require their students to study international law, but nearly all of the schools in Quebec
have adopted CILE.61 The functionalist and socio-political variables discussed above cannot account for such
intra-national variation.
Table 5: Historical Explanations for Variation in CILE (Binary Variables)
Percentage of states
Statistically significant
with
difference?
Low CILE (%)
High CILE (%)
Legal tradition
Civil law (80)
5.00 (4)
95.00 (76)
Yes***
Common law (45)
42.22 (19)
57.78 (26)
Yes***
Islamic law (20)
0.00 (0)
100.00 (20)
Yes**
Mixed (16)
25.00 (4)
75.00 (12)
No
Region
Africa (28)
17.86 (5)
82.14 (23)
No
Americas (33)
6.06 (2)
93.94 (31)
Yes*
Asia (17)
17.65 (3)
82.35 (14)
No
Europe (36)
11.11 (4)
88.89 (32)
No
Middle East and North Africa
0.00 (0)
100 (24)
Yes**
(24)
Oceania (13)
100 (13)
0.00 (0)
Yes***
Post-Soviet Union (10)
0.00 (0)
100 (10)
No
Overall (161)
16.77 (27)
83.23 (134)
Note: Parentheses indicate number of states. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
If civil law and Islamic law states both converge so strongly around the same CILE classification, what accounts
for the much greater variation among common law states? The answer appears to be region. Table 5 shows
that, overall, CILE classifications are highly uniform within regions, though only the Americas, the Middle East
and North Africa and Oceania are statistically significant categories when compared to the overall sample. Table
6 further demonstrates the explanatory power of region by depicting CILE classifications across regions for
common law states. This table shows that, although only 57.78 per cent of all common law states have high
CILE, 100 per cent of common law states in Oceania have low CILE. Meanwhile, most common law states in
Africa, the Americas and Asia exhibit classification patterns that are almost identical to those of the regions
themselves. In other words, schools in civil law and Islamic law states tend to converge on the curricular
patterns of states that share their legal tradition, but schools in common law states tend to converge on the
curricular patterns of states that share their region.
Table 6: Regional Variation in CILE among Common Law States
Percentage of common law
states with
Low CILE (%)

Statistically significant
difference?
High CILE
(%)

Region
Africa (9)
22.22 (2)
77.78 (7)
No
Americas (14)
14.29 (2)
85.71 (12)
Yes***
Asia (7)
14.29 (1)
85.71 (6)
No
Europe (3)
66.67 (2)
33.33 (1)
No
Middle East and North
–
–
–
Africa (0)
Oceania (12)
100 (12)
0.00 (0)
Yes***
Post-Soviet Union (0)
–
–
–
Overall (45)
42.22 (19)
57.78 (26)
Note: Parentheses indicate number of states. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.

D Relative Impact and Robustness
We conclude this section of the article by analysing the relative impact of each of the variables we have
discussed and checking the robustness of our bivariate findings. Figure 4 depicts the average change in the
predicted probability of a high rate of compulsory training for each variable across the three categories of
explanation. For binary variables, we measure change as the average shift in the predicted probability of a highCILE designation produced by a change from 0 (variable absent) to 1 (variable present). For continuous variables,
we measure change as the average shift in the predicted probability of high CILE produced by a change from the
25th percentile to the 75th percentile. The dots in Figure 4 reflect estimates of change in predicted probabilities,
while the solid horizontal lines depict the ranges within which the estimates are likely to fall, at the 90 per cent
confidence level. A horizontal line that does not intersect 0 indicates confidence at the 90 per cent level that the
given variable is associated with a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of compulsory training.
Figure 4: Magnitude of Effects on Likelihood of High CILE (Individual Bivariate Logit Models)

As Figure 4 shows, several variables exhibit statistically significant effects: human rights protection, civil law
system, common law system and Americas, though the effect of human rights protection is opposite of our
prediction, as discussed above.62 Having a civil law system increases the likelihood of a high-CILE designation by
roughly 0.25 per cent. Given that the baseline probability of such a designation is already 0.83 per cent, the
presence of a civil law system amounts to a near sufficient condition for a high rate of compulsory training. In
contrast, having a common law system decreases the likelihood of a high-CILE classification by approximately
0.26 per cent, bringing the baseline conditional probability of such a classification to roughly 0.57 per cent for

common law states, which is comparable to a coin toss. As shown in Table 6, region explains most of the
remaining variation across common law states.
Figure 5 in turn displays the results of three multivariate logistic regression models – one each for civil law,
common law and mixed tradition – across the three categories of independent variables. These models provide
an additional check on the robustness of the results from the bivariate models and suggest the same
conclusions. Even while controlling for functional and socio-political factors, a civil law system increases the
likelihood of high CILE by about 0.27 per cent. Likewise, with the same controls, the presence of a common law
system decreases the likelihood of high CILE by about 0.43 per cent. A mixed system does not exhibit a
statistically significant relationship with CILE.
Figure 5: Magnitude of Effects on Likelihood of High CILE (Multivariate Logit Models)

In sum, variables based on historical circumstance are far more capable of explaining CILE patterns than
functionalist or socio-political variables. In the next section, we explore possible explanations for these findings.

3 The Roles of Legal Tradition and Region
Legal tradition and geographic region correlate highly with CILE rates, but what is it about these factors that
produces different approaches to CILE? We draw on research in comparative law, political science and sociology
to discuss a number of plausible mechanisms underlying these correlations. The limits of our data mean that we
cannot test these mechanisms directly, but future research should aim to assess their relative merits.

A Legal Tradition
Legal tradition may influence the likelihood of CILE in two possible ways, one as an outgrowth of philosophical or
doctrinal characteristics that are inherent to the legal cultures of these traditions (the ‘culture thesis’) and the
other due to choices made at distant historical moments and reinforced through path dependence over time
(the ‘path dependence thesis’). One version of the culture thesis would focus on long-standing jurisprudential
connections between international law and domestic legal tradition. Early public international law is often said
to have been substantially reflective of civil law concepts and principles,63 and the evidence of this influence
remains apparent today. To name one example, the design of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
its successor, the International Court of Justice, affirms the principle of bona fides, which is fundamental to civil
law systems, and formally rejects the principle of stare decisis, which is fundamental to common law systems.
Similarly, there is a long history of Islamic law principles on inter-civilizational relations,64 some of which may

have shaped contemporary international law on issues such as the treatment of religious minorities and
prisoners of war.65 The common law, in contrast, is said to have exerted little influence over public international
law until the 20th century.66 These historical relations may have cemented varying degrees of comfort with, or
affinity for, international law in states with different legal traditions at critical moments in the development of
modern legal education and, in turn, spurred divergent approaches to CILE.
Another version of the culture thesis would conceive of CILE as an outgrowth of generic features of legal
education within each legal tradition. Under this approach, common law, civil law and Islamic law engender
divergent philosophies of legal education, and these philosophies in turn encourage disparate approaches to
CILE. By standard accounts, the civil law conceives of law as an organized field of knowledge and posits that the
primary purpose of legal education is to supply a ‘panoramic’ view of the major subfields, concepts and
principles.67 In this tradition, ‘instruction … is more abstract, more concerned with questions of philosophic than
immediate practical importance, [and] more removed from the solution of social problems’.68 Although the
English literature on contemporary legal education in Islamic law states is limited, there are indications that a
similar philosophy prevails in those jurisdictions.69 The common law, in contrast, is said to envision law as a
profession and to treat the acquisition of skills and analytic techniques as the primary purpose of instruction.70
This difference could explain the CILE data in a couple of related ways. First, in civil law and Islamic law
jurisdictions, the relative lack of concern for the practical value of the curriculum might help to justify a
compulsory course on a subfield that is often said to carry limited relevance for many lawyers.71 The common
law’s reputed emphasis on instruction that is professionally useful, meanwhile, could have the opposite effect;
given limited resources, schools might decline CILE on the view that knowledge of international law is relatively
unhelpful for students hoping to secure employment as a lawyer.
Second, in civil law and Islamic law jurisdictions, the goal of imparting broad knowledge might impel relevant
actors to designate a wider array of doctrinal courses as compulsory. Under this possibility, states with civil law
and Islamic law traditions exhibit higher CILE rates not because they care more about international law per se
but, rather, because international law happens to be a distinct area of law and, thus, an important component
of the type of curriculum that is idealized. By similar logic, relative indifference towards panoramic doctrinal
knowledge might yield lower CILE rates in common law jurisdictions. If the principal goal is to enhance student
capacities for analogical reasoning, exegesis, legal writing and the like, there is little reason to mandate the
study of international law (or any other topic); students might acquire relevant skills through instruction on torts
or civil procedure as much as the law of the sea or state responsibility.
In contrast to the culture thesis, the path-dependence thesis would posit that inter-traditional difference is a
product not of dispositions inherent to these approaches to law but, rather, of early, contingent organizational
choices at influential universities. Distinct approaches to CILE appear to date back to the 19th century, when
university courses on international law first emerged. Christopher Langdell’s curriculum at Harvard University
focused exclusively on domestic and private law,72 and the curriculum in mid-century England included no
mandatory elements.73 French universities in this period, however, required students to study international
law.74 It is not clear why this difference appeared, but the answer could be as mundane as historical disparities
in resources, the personal preferences of those in charge of curricula at critical junctures or the views of
influential commentators. To illustrate, it is well known that John Austin rejected international law’s claim to
legal status, in disagreement with many continental writers.75 Perhaps academics at leading universities in
common law jurisdictions were more inclined to oppose CILE in deference to the views of a fellow common law
theorist. Whatever the underlying explanation, the key is that the early choices of a few elite institutions may
have normalized divergent models of legal education and that these models, in turn, may have diffused along
well-established pathways of norm transmission, such as colonial ties, that are segregated by legal tradition.76

B Region
When it comes to civil law and Islamic law systems, legal tradition is highly determinative of CILE classification.
But even though common law states are more likely to have low CILE than the average state, there is still wide
variation among them. As discussed above, region is almost entirely responsible for this remaining variation.
What is it about region that promotes convergence?
Two factors might play a role. First, in some cases, regional states have pooled their resources to create a shared
system of instruction. The leading example is the Agreement Establishing the Council of Legal Education, which
over a dozen states in the Caribbean Community adopted in 1970.77 Under this agreement, graduates from any
of three schools – Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica, Hugh Wooding Law School in Trinidad and Tobago
and Eugene Dupuch Law School in The Bahamas – are qualified to practise in jurisdictions throughout the
region.78 Similarly, some governments in Oceania accept degrees from the University of Papua New Guinea and
Fiji’s University of the South Pacific as qualification for domestic legal practice.79 These arrangements appear to
make it possible for the schools to operate in states where resource constraints, a small population and perhaps
other conditions limit the domestic demand for legal education. One result is extensive intra-regional
convergence of law school curricula and, as a result, a high level of intra-regional uniformity with respect to
CILE.80
Second, even where states do not share law schools, norms of legal education might diffuse more easily within a
region than across multiple regions. An influential typology suggests that diffusion can occur as a result of
international competition, learning and emulation.81 Under the competition model, a new policy in one state
increases the costs or reduces the benefits of the status quo for the others, who respond by copying the
innovation to maintain their relative competitiveness.82 Under the learning model, diffusion occurs when states
perceive that an earlier innovation was sufficiently successful to merit replication.83 Finally, the emulation model
posits that diffusion occurs when exemplars, experts or peers succeed in socially constructing a reform as
legitimate, such that others must follow suit to maintain their own legitimacy.84
These mechanisms might operate more intensely within regions in a variety of ways. If intra-regional schools are
more likely to compete with one another for applicants and prestige, there will be particularly strong incentives
to replicate each other’s reforms to neutralize the advantages that might otherwise accrue to innovators. In this
scenario, one state or university pursues or declines CILE, and the selected reform spreads as other regional
actors work to negate the reputational gains of the pioneer.
Learning-based diffusion might also be more robust at the regional level. Operating on the premise that
decision-makers frequently lack the resources to systematically identify and evaluate their options, a number of
scholars have argued that policy learning rests on decisional shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, which
‘induces people to assign disproportionate weight to particularly striking, vivid, memorable information and to
overestimate the significance or relative frequency of such cognitively available information’.85 On this view,
diffusion is more robust within a region because the policy choices of geographically proximate actors are
relatively salient.86 As applied to CILE, the implications are that training rates will show regional clustering if the
individuals who set them tend to learn primarily from the practices of neighbouring states and universities or if
views about the merits of CILE spread within academic networks that are predominantly regional in character.
Finally, it is plausible that emulation-based diffusion is more substantial within regions than among them.
Sociological institutionalism suggests that organizations such as universities adopt policies that conform to the
prescriptions of world culture in order to acquire legitimacy and resources, regardless of local conditions.87 This
research helps to account for otherwise perplexing instances of structural isomorphism in various types of
organizations around the globe,88 but it does not rule out the possibility of cross-national variation or regional
culture, which might exert relatively strong influence over organizational structures for any number of reasons,

including a comparative abundance of ethnic, religious and geographic commonalities that could help to
construct the activities of regional actors as relatively legitimate and important.89 In short, regional logics of
appropriateness could influence CILE rates to a greater extent than, and even at cross-purposes with, world
society at large.
Regional organizations might facilitate each of these mechanisms. The EU’s Bologna Process has promoted
comparability and recognition of degrees, quality assurance and student mobility among universities in 47
participating states in the EU and beyond,90 and the associated Tuning Project has facilitated regional
convergence of curricula on a variety of subjects.91 Since the 1980s, the EU has also helped to network
universities from different states under the Erasmus Program, which facilitates student exchanges.92 Meanwhile,
comparable regional efforts have emerged in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.93 These developments
have reportedly stimulated international regulatory competition, whereby states work to implement approved
educational policies to maintain or enhance their relative economic positions,94 and appear to have facilitated
learning and emulation by fostering communication among policy-makers and experts.95 To be sure, most of the
regional efforts towards integration in higher education are not specific to law schools, but it is easy to imagine
spillover effects.
Whatever the precise mechanism, diffusion theory appears consonant with much of the data. It would explain
why common law states converge on high CILE rates in regions with large concentrations of civil law
jurisdictions, such as the Americas, despite the fact that such rates are generally less typical in common law
states. It would also explain why common law states in Oceania exhibit comparatively low rates; because this
region is home to few civil law jurisdictions, the forces of regional convergence are more likely to reflect the
default approach of common law states, which is to eschew CILE.

4 Implications
We believe that our findings carry significance for researchers and policy-makers alike. First, in pointing to the
importance of legal tradition, the data identify at least one situation in which professional culture appears to be
the primary source of cross-national variation. To say that CILE correlates with legal tradition far more than
other variables, including regime type and globalization rates, is to suggest that national differences are not
necessarily a product of political dispositions or the strategic pursuit of national interests. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine how high CILE could be in the interests of the numerous and diverse jurisdictions that use civil law and
Islamic law but in the interests of only a handful of jurisdictions that use common law.
The explanatory power of historical variables is in turn significant because the strategy for mitigating crossnational differences, whether on CILE or other matters of international law, should vary depending on their
underlying source. The evidence that differences in CILE reflect neither functional demands nor most sociopolitical conditions suggests that efforts to enhance cross-national uniformity need not focus on those issues to
succeed. To the contrary, the importance of legal tradition and region raise the possibility that the most useful
efforts towards harmonization will be those that create opportunities for certain forms of mutual socialization;
government regulators, law faculties and university administrators might gradually acquire common
perspectives on CILE and other matters if given opportunities to observe the models that predominate
elsewhere. The most valuable programmes will be both inter-traditional and inter-regional.
Second, the findings suggest that graduates of law programmes in common law jurisdictions are less likely to
possess even a basic familiarity with international law. To be clear, CILE is not a perfect indicator of the
commonality of international legal education; many students at some universities in low-CILE jurisdictions study
international law on their own initiative. James Crawford has suggested that ‘most’ law students at Cambridge
University, for example, study international law even though it is not mandatory.96 But this sort of enthusiasm

does not manifest in all common law jurisdictions.97 And, even where it is present, we think it unlikely that
voluntary enrolment rates at the national level reach anything close to 100 per cent – a number that is common
in high-CILE jurisdictions. In the absence of cross-national data on course enrolment rates, cross-national
disparities in CILE remain a meaningful indicator of the variable commonality of international legal education.
This variation seems likely to carry significance. Social psychological research on persuasion offers reasons to
think that the classroom is a particularly favourable environment for shaping attitudes, especially on a topic,
such as international law, on which many students possess little prior familiarity.98 Indeed, there is mounting
empirical evidence of such influence.99 One recent study reports that mandatory training on the law of armed
conflict effectively socialized cadets at the US Military Academy to be more sensitive towards the treatment of
civilians in wartime and that the intensity of this training corresponded with the extent of the attitude change
that occurred.100 Recent experimental research similarly shows that when individuals are more knowledgeable
about international law, their policy preferences are more likely to conform to international legal
obligations.101 Given that law graduates often influence decisions about international law compliance as
government elites and legal experts,102 it is plausible that these dynamics shape state action in favour of respect
for international law over the long run.
Our findings thus raise the possibility that law schools in common law jurisdictions contribute less to the
international rule of law than their counterparts in civil law jurisdictions. Elite universities in common law
jurisdictions do tend to train a disproportionate share of international law elites from around the world.103 In
that sense, one might argue that common law schools contribute materially to the international rule of law even
while frequently exhibiting low rates of CILE. But foreign students in common law schools are likely already
disposed towards an interest in international law and represent only a small proportion of law school graduates
globally. Thus, insofar as low CILE corresponds with lower levels of international legal education in general,
common law schools appear less likely to socialize many of their graduates to internalize favourable views of
international law.104 We think it plausible, moreover, that the decision to eschew CILE devalues international law
in the eyes of all law graduates by implicitly framing the field as non-essential and peripheral. In these ways,
common law schools might undermine societal respect for international law even while training and socializing
many of the field’s elite.
In any event, further research is needed on CILE’s causal significance. High rates of voluntary training might
diminish the significance of CILE, but the global commonality of such training is unclear. And although education
seems likely to generate respect for international law, it might not. If students resent compulsory study and
respond with hostility, CILE could even disserve the efficacy of international norms. We see no evidence in the
current literature of such a ‘backlash’ effect, but future research should aim to assess the potentially divergent
consequences of compulsory and elective study, among other features of the global pattern.
For now, a series of intriguing questions arise from our findings. Do lawyers in common law jurisdictions make
use of international law less frequently than lawyers in civil law jurisdictions? In turn, do national publics in
common law jurisdictions tend to know less about, or exhibit less respect for, international law? Do states with
common law traditions tend to violate international norms at greater rates? Are students who leave civil law
jurisdictions to study abroad at common law schools more likely to return home with sceptical views about
international law? If universities are important venues for socialization and the diffusion of legal knowledge, one
can imagine that the answers might be affirmative. And yet, such a possibility stands in considerable tension
with the instincts of common law lawyers, who tend to perceive states such as China, Iran and Russia – all of
which have extremely high CILE rates – as less respectful of international norms than states such as the United
Kingdom and the USA, both of which have extremely low rates. In these ways, the results signal intriguing
avenues of future inquiry.

Third, and by similar logic, the regional findings suggest inter-regional variation in the commonality of
international legal knowledge. In particular, we should expect to see greater familiarity with international law
among graduates in the Americas and the Middle East and North Africa and less among graduates in Oceania.
Depending on the quality of the training that occurs in these regions and the societal influence of graduates,
regional fluctuations in the efficacy of international law might follow. Future research might profitably examine
whether that is the case.
Fourth, our results carry implications for a long-standing debate over the contemporary significance of legal
families. There is ample evidence of cross-traditional transplantation of norms among states, including on
matters of legal education.105 As discussed earlier, there is also evidence of a world society that similarly
socializes educational organizations across the globe.106 Perhaps for these reasons, some have argued that legal
families have become less useful as conceptual frameworks.107 But, at least with respect to CILE, this argument
clearly does not hold. The continuing influence of national traditions on CILE coheres with evidence that norms
diffuse primarily within legal families108 and stands as an exception to the reported tendency for structural
isomorphism among educational organizations around the world.109
Finally, the evidence that CILE rates do not correlate with societal needs suggests that there is room for law
schools to improve the practical utility of their curricula. Depending on national conditions, this might entail
either abandoning or adopting CILE, along with other possible measures. In jurisdictions such as Ireland, the
United Kingdom or the USA, where extremely low rates of compulsory training coexist with high degrees of
trade openness and economic development, a functional approach to international legal education would seem
to call for more instruction, whether by compulsion or otherwise. In this sense, conventional wisdom that
functionalism justifies the marginalization of international legal education in these states seems to have things
precisely backwards. At a minimum, their law schools have greater reason to adopt CILE than schools in the
many states that are less connected with international society.

5 Conclusion
Research in comparative international law has been far more successful at identifying national differences than
at ascertaining their origins. To help correct for this condition, we have used new, original data and quantitative
methods to test for the determinants of cross-national variation with respect to a discrete area of practice:
compulsory international legal education. The findings that legal tradition and regional geography predict
variation undermine accounts that attribute all differences to national needs or socio-political conditions,
suggest a variety of new research questions and indicate that, in at least one area, inter-traditional and interregional socialization might be the most effective mechanism for harmonizing national practices and
perspectives.
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Appendix: CILE Rate Classifications
Table A1: States Classified as High CILE
Afghanistan
Cuba
Albania
Cyprus
Algeria
Czech Republic
Andorra
Democratic Republic of Congo
Angola
Denmark
Antigua and Barbuda
Djibouti
Argentina
Dominica
Armenia
Dominican Republic
Austria
East Timor
Bahamas
Ecuador
Bahrain
Egypt
Bangladesh
El Salvador
Barbados
Estonia
Belgium
Ethiopia
Belize
Finland
Bolivia
France
Bosnia
Georgia
Botswana
Greece
Brazil
Grenada

Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius

Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia

Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Italy
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo

Table A2: States Classified as Low CILE
Australia
Marshall Islands
Canada
Micronesia
Fiji
Nauru
Germany
New Zealand
Ghana
Nigeria
Ireland
Papua New Guinea
Ivory Coast
Samoa
Japan
San Marino
Kiribati
Senegal

Mexico
Moldova
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Seychelles
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Korea
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Kingdom
United States
Vanuatu
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